on Tor users that leaksAttack.Databreachtheir real IP and a few other details . The attackAttack.Phishingthat the research team put together relies on trickingAttack.Phishinga Tor user into accessing a web page that contains ads that emit ultrasounds or accessing a page that contains hidden JavaScript code that forces the browser to emit the ultrasounds via the HTML5 Audio API . According to Mavroudis , the mobile phone must have an app installed that has embedded one of the many advertising SDKs that include support for uXDT . In tests carried out by Mavroudis , the researcher has interceptedAttack.Databreachsome of the traffic these ultrasound beacons trigger on behalf of the phone , traffic which contains details such as the user 's real IP address , geo-location coordinates , telephone number , Android ID , IMEI code , and device MAC address . According to Mavroudis , there are multiple ways to deliver these attacks other than social-engineering Tor users to access certain URLs , where these ultrasound beacons can be served . Similarly , the attackers could also run a malicious Tor exit node and perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack , forcibly injecting the malicious code that triggers uXDT beacons in all Tor traffic going through that Tor node . A simpler attack method would also be to hide the ultrasounds , which are inaudible to human ears , inside videos or audio files that certain Tor users might be opening . The FBI might be very interested in this method and could deploy it to track viewers of child pornography videos on the Tor network , just like it previously did in Operation Playpen , where it used a Flash exploit .